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NIGERIA: THE CHIBOK GIRLS’ ABDUCTION AND THE CHANGING 
NARRATIVES IN SAMBISA FOREST 
Mike Omilusi1 
Abstract: Nigeria has had a chequered history of conflict situations such as civil war, inter and 
intra ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts among others. Northern Nigeria, in particular, has been 
greatly threatened by armed conflicts in recent years. Indeed, the remote northeast region is 
ground zero for many of the world’s most vexing problems, including an Islamic militant 
insurgency, crippling poverty, and declining development. In 2014, no fewer than 276 
schoolgirls were abducted in Borno state by the Boko Haram sect that has ravaged the region 
since 2009. The audacious kidnapping brought the insurgency to world attention, triggering 
global outrage that galvanised support from many local and international actors. The girls have 
become a symbol of Nigeria’s brutal conflict. The failure of Nigeria's former government to act 
quickly to free the girls sparked a global Bring Back Our Girls movement. While the abduction 
sparked international outrage in a frantic bid to rescue the girls, some undercurrents were 
playing out locally that now deserve academic review. This essay is thus, an attempt to further 
interrogate the nature, nuances, shenanigan, politics and various rescue missions that 
characterise the Chibok girls’ abduction. It particularly reviews the activities of both local and 
international dimensions of #Bring Back Our Girls campaign within the socio-cultural and 
political contexts of the time while putting on spotlight issues of post-trauma facilities expected 
for the rescued girls and the fate of those still in captivity. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The general breakdown in law and order which occurs during conflict and displacement 
leads to an increase in all forms of violence (WHO, 1997). Armed conflict and uprootedness 
bring their own distinct forms of violence against women with them (ibid). Violence against 
women is not a problem that affects only the poor or only women in the Third World; it affects 
women worldwide of all races and income groups (Carrillo, 1991:18). In all societies, to a 
greater or lesser degree, women and girls are subjected to physical, sexual and psychological 
abuse that cuts across lines of income, class and culture (United Nations, 2010). Violence 
against women and girls continues to be a global epidemic that wounds, tortures, and slays – 
physically, psychologically, sexually and economically. It is one of the most pervasive of 
human rights violations, denying women and girls’ equality, security, dignity, self-esteem, and 
their right to enjoy fundamental freedoms. Violence against women is present in every country, 
cutting across boundaries of culture, class, education, income, ethnicity and age (Sandro, 
2008:5).  
Nigeria has been embroiled in a conflict with Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-da’wa wal-
Jihad (popularly known as ‘Boko Haram’), which has been designated a terrorist organisation 
by the United States, Nigeria and the UN. Boko Haram’s campaign extends beyond education 
to include socio-economic inequalities and politics (Nti, 2014).  Human rights groups estimate 
that some 2,000 people, most of them women and girls, have been kidnapped by Boko Haram 
since 2009. But there is no comprehensive tally of the disappeared, and some research suggests 
the total number could be much higher. Formed in 2002, Boko Haram has killed thousands in 
northern Nigeria and neighbouring Cameroon, Niger and Chad with the recruitment of child 
soldiers a continuing tactic used by the Islamist group. In 2014, the group tore through northeast 
Nigeria, capturing villages and towns, and taking their inhabitants hostage (Alfred, 2016). The 
high-profile Chibok kidnapping put a spotlight on the unique role of girls in armed conflict. 
This group claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of almost three hundred girls aged 
between 16 and 18 from the Government Girls Secondary School in rural Chibok, Borno State 
in Northern Nigeria. Shekau threatened to sell the girls as slaves and marry them off because 
‘God instructed me to sell them, they are his properties and I will carry out his instructions’ 
(Campbell, 2014b). 
In response to the kidnapping, a global movement started by women in Nigeria has 
focused on the issues of sexual terrorism, deformed masculinity and the trafficking of women 
internationally. This movement mobilized under the banner of #Bring Back Our Girls has 
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opened new avenues for political mobilization (Campbell, 2014b). The release of another set of 
girls in May 2017 was a significant victory in the Nigerian government’s fight against Boko 
Haram. Its campaign under President Muhammadu Buhari has diminished the group so 
substantially that officials were unconcerned about releasing five detained Boko Haram 
commanders in exchange for the girls (Searcey and Sawab, 2017). This essay is an attempt to 
further interrogate the nature, nuances, shenanigan, captivity and various rescue missions that 
characterise the Chibok girls. It particularly reviews the activities of both local and international 
dimensions of #Bring Back Our Girls campaign within the socio-cultural and political contexts 
of the time while putting on spotlight issues of post-trauma facilities expected for the rescued 
girls and the fate of those still in captivity. 
 
II. Conceptual Exploration 
 
The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful 
violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 
ideological objectives.” This definition focuses on threat as much as the actual act of violence 
and the targeting of the whole society as well as the government even though the definition did 
not distinguish between attacks on military combatant and non-combatant civilians. 
Nevertheless, three commonalities can be discerned from these official definitions; (1) the use 
of violence, (2) political objectives; and (3) the intention of sowing fear in the target population. 
It is tragic that violence against women and girls is such a vast and wide-ranging topic. 
In addition to violence in intimate relationships, there are many other forms of violence that 
routinely undermine the well-being of women and girls. In some settings, the risk of violence 
begins prior to birth, with selective abortion of female foetuses and carries forward through 
childhood where girls and boys are at risk of harsh physical punishment, child maltreatment, 
and sexual abuse, often at the hands of the very adults charged with their care (Heise, 2011:2).  
In violent conflicts, vulnerability of all segments of the population increases, as poverty, 
hunger, fear and desperation is prevalent. Women and girls are at risk of exchanging sex for 
“food, shelter, safe passage, identification papers or other necessities for themselves and their 
families” (Machel, 2001). 
Perpetrators of violence against women are most often their intimate partners. Women 
are abused physically and sexually by intimate partners at different rates throughout the world 
– yet such abuse occurs in all countries or areas, without exception. Younger women are more 
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at risk than older women and since the consequences of such violence last a lifetime it has a 
severely adverse impact on women’s family and social life(United Nations, 2010). In conflict 
and displacement situations, some groups of women and girls are particularly vulnerable. These 
include targeted ethnic groups, where there is an official or unofficial policy of using rape as a 
weapon of genocide. Unaccompanied women or children, children in foster care arrangements, 
and lone female heads of households are all frequent targets. Elderly women and those with 
physical or mental disabilities are also vulnerable, as are those women who are held in detention 
and in detention-like situations including concentration camps (WHO, 1997). While rates of 
women exposed to violence vary from one region to the other, statistics indicate that violence 
against women is a universal phenomenon and women are subjected to different forms of 
violence – physical, sexual, psychological and economic – both within and outside their homes. 
Gender-based terrorism is the systematic and repeated victimisation of women and girls 
that affects all of their rights (to life, liberty, health, education, play, freedom of expression and 
freedom of movement, etc.) and creates a situation of permanent anxiety concerning their 
personal security in a context of terrorist activity (in which they suffer kidnapping, rape, 
mutilation, exploitation, use as human shields, forced involvement in small arms trafficking, 
slavery, sexual exploitation by the group), aimed at demoralising the enemy (de la 
Luz,2008:19). 
 
III. Violence Against Women and Girls During Armed Conflicts: An Overview 
 
The end of the Cold War in 1989 did not, as had been expected, bring about a reduction 
in armed conflicts. More than two thirds of the poorest countries in the world are in conflict 
regions. The nature of armed conflict has changed. In the past, wars used to be waged almost 
solely between two sovereign states, but so-called modern wars are fought in quite different 
ways. The international community faces a completely new situation, an immensely complex 
nexus of diverse causes and warring parties (Austrian Development Agency, 2009). Today, 
warfare is increasingly taking on intra-national forms (domestic or cross-border armed conflicts 
among disintegrating states, civil wars or rebellions), now exceeding international conflicts in 
terms of absolute numbers but also of intensity. The former demarcated fronts between two 
well-trained national military forces are being superseded by new actors, such as warlords, 
rebels, mercenaries and child soldiers (Austrian Development Agency, 2009). Violence against 
Women or Gender-Based Violence is an age long psychological and social issue deep-rooted 
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in world societies: developed, developing or third world countries. In some societies, cultural 
practices, norms and beliefs fuel the behaviours and relegate woman to second class status. 
Like men, women play a variety of roles during conflict, from peacemakers and political 
advocates to victims and perpetrators. Nonetheless, on average, women experience conflict 
differently from men. Men form the majority of combatants and are more likely to be killed in 
combat. Women are less likely to take up arms, but die in higher numbers from war’s indirect 
effects—the breakdown in social order, human rights abuses, the spread of infectious diseases, 
and economic devastation (O’Reilly and Paffenholz apud Pluemper and Neumeyer, 2006). 
Violence against women not only maims and debilitates women, femicide, the death of women 
from gender violence, kills them on a large scale from pre-birth onward (Carrillo, 1991:22). 
Adolescent girls and female children are at heightened risk of violence during times of 
conflict and crisis. Because of their age, gender, and restricted social status, girls can be 
exploited, harassed, and abused by family members, military, armed groups, police, 
peacekeeping forces and humanitarian aid workers (Siddiqi, 2012). When armed conflict 
weakens normal community structures of support and protection, their vulnerability is increased 
(Holste-Roness, 2006). Thus, violence against women is a global outrage. The experience or 
threat of violence affects the lives of women everywhere, cutting across boundaries of wealth, 
race and culture. In the home and in the community, in times of war and peace, women are 
beaten, raped, mutilated and killed with impunity (Amnesty International, 2004). 
From birth to death, in times of peace as well as war, women face discrimination and 
violence at the hands of the state, the community and the family. Female infanticide deprives 
countless women of life itself. Rape and sexual abuse by relatives, other men, security officials 
or armed combatants are inflicted on millions of girls and women every year. Some forms of 
violence, such as forced pregnancies, forced abortions, bride-burning and dowry-related abuses 
are unique to women. Others, such as domestic violence – also known as intimate partner abuse, 
wife-beating and battering – are disproportionately suffered by women. During conflicts, 
violence against women is often used as a weapon of war, in order to dehumanize the women 
themselves, or to persecute the community to which they belong (Amnesty International, 2004). 
Violence against women is not confined to any particular political or economic system, but is 
prevalent in every society in the world and cuts across boundaries of wealth, race and culture. 
The power structures within society which perpetuate violence against women are deep-rooted 
and intransigent. 
States have however, taken various initiatives to combat violence against women, 
including numerous criminal justice initiatives. Progress has been achieved in the effective 
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criminalization of various forms of violence against women in domestic law, the simplification 
of evidentiary requirements and the reform of criminal procedure to facilitate the prosecution 
of these crimes, the establishment of specialized courts and dedicated services to deal with 
various types of violence against women (Skinnider and Dandurand, 2015:40).  
 
IV. Terrorism in Nigeria and the Gender Perspective 
 
Throughout the 20th century, terrorism was largely limited to regional and national 
boundaries, and predominantly based on revolutionary nationalism in the fight against colonial 
powers. However, since the attacks in the United States in 2001 by Al Qaeda, smaller terrorist 
groups have been emboldened to strike far and wide, and to use terroristic tactics in waging 
bloody and asymmetrical warfare in numerous countries (Osita-Njoku and Chikere, 2015). In 
recent years, terrorist networks have evolved, moving away from a dependency on state 
sponsorship; many of the most dangerous groups and individuals now operate as non-state 
actors. Taking advantage of porous borders and interconnected international systems—finance, 
communications, and transit—terrorist groups can reach every corner of the globe. While some 
remain focused on local or national political dynamics, others seek to affect global change 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). 
In Nigeria, 2001 was also the year which saw the emergence of the Boko Haram 
insurgency which targeted what they saw as the “evil” of western education, including the 
education of girls (Osita-Njoku and Chikere, 2015). Boko Haram is an insurgent group in north-
eastern Nigeria employing organized terror to advance its objectives. In its early days, it was 
supported by al-Qaeda and appears to have first become active in a noticeable way in 2002. 
Headquartered in an Islamic center in Maiduguri, Borno State, it recruited combatants from the 
children of poor, dispossessed Nigerians, as well as Chadian and Nigerien children enrolled in 
its Islamic schools (Chothia 2013; Wilhelm 2015). The Boko- Haram terrorist sect is motivated 
by the obnoxious philosophy-western education is evil and the groups’ adherents appear to be 
thoroughly indoctrinated in the incomprehensible doctrine of the absurd. The terror group has 
embarked on heinous human rights abuses and war crimes: forced conversion of people of other 
faith to Islam; murder, torture and persecution of members of other religions; wanton attacks 
on churches and mosques and killing of women, children and civilian (non-combatant) 
populations  (Human Rights watch, 2013). 
The Boko Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital 
of the north-eastern state of Borno as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist group advocating strict 
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Sharia law and opposing the westernizing of Nigerian society which accounts for the name 
‘Boko Haram’ meaning ‘Western Education is forbidden’. Yusuf used existing infrastructure 
in Borno of the Izala society, a popular conservative Islamic sect originally welcomed into 
government to recruit members before breaking away to form his own faction.. However, the 
sect initially operated in a quietist nature, conducting its operations more or less peacefully 
during the first seven years of its existence. They then withdrew from society into remote north-
eastern areas but were soon to change into a Salafist-Jihadi group known for terrorist attacks 
since 2009 with political goal of creating an Islamic state (Egbue  et al, 2015). Although Boko 
Haram has been linked with al-Qaeda over the years, it expressed support for the Islamic State 
(IS) in 2014 and pledged formal allegiance on 7 March, 2015. 
Violent extremism has severely affected Northern Nigeria, resulting in death, 
kidnappings, abductions, sexual abuse and slavery, the destruction of property, political 
instability, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and deepening mistrust and 
enmity among different groups in the region.(Peace Direct, 2016:14). Boko Haram’s rise and 
insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, often casting 
them voluntarily or by force into new roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined to escape 
their social conditions; others were abducted and enslaved (ICG, 2016). The group is not 
centrally organised. It operates in different areas with different local commanders, who often 
send fighters from one area to undertake attacks in another, or move units around. 
While it could be argued that the history of Nigeria is replete with the activities of 
Islamic sects, it is a fact that a multiplicity of domestic actors and interests combine within the 
complex political environment that the Nigerian represents to sustain the philosophy of these 
groups (Adetayo 2014). The Nigerian military repression of Boko Haram’s July 2009 uprising 
and the emergency rule imposed by government in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in north-
east-Nigeria in 2012 certainly contributed to an intensification of violence and the group’s 
transformation into a terrorist group. Equally contributory was the extra-judicial killing of 
Mohammed Yusuf in police custody in July 2009 which led to the enthronement of the more 
radicalized members of the group headed by Abubakar Shekau (The Guardian, 2012). 
Prior to 2009, Boko Haram did not express commitment to the violent overthrow of the 
Nigerian government. Instead, Yusuf condemned northern Muslims for participating in what 
he described as “an illegitimate, non-Islamic state and preached a doctrine of withdrawal” 
(quoted in Okome, 2017:5). With increased conflict between Christians and Muslims, 
government crackdowns on Boko Haram in Maiduguri and elsewhere, as well as rampant police 
brutality and violent measures by state agents culminating in the deaths of approximately seven 
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hundred of its members (including Yusuf), Boko Haram became radicalized, with its central 
objective expanding to the creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria (Sergie and Johnson 2014).  
Boko Haram’s act of terrorism in Nigeria was the reason why “the country witnessed 
the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per 
cent to 7,512 fatalities and has become the most deadly terrorist group in the world” (Global 
Terrorism Index, 2015). According to Global Terrorism Index Report 2015, Boko Haram 
featured prominently in the world’s 20 most fatal terrorist attacks in 2014. A Nigerian military 
offensive against Boko Haram reclaimed much of the territory once held by the radical group—
which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) in 2015. Although Boko 
Haram faces strong pushback and loss of territories, it remains capable of launching attacks just 
as the militants retain the ability to carry out regular suicide bombings and gun attacks in 
Nigeria and surrounding countries. 
It is posited that all armed conflicts are gendered: “A gender neutral discourse may 
conceal that the post-war period is crowded with gendered decisions” (Enloe 1993: 261). Both 
women and men suffer from traumas, abuses and loss of control caused by war, but the impact 
of these factors is experienced differently by women and men. Gender plays an important role 
as women are often disproportionately affected by religious violence and conflict. On-going 
armed conflict in Northern Nigeria has led to divisions within communities that were once 
peaceful: rioting, looting, rape, killings, economic loss, and fear of other religious groups are 
some of its consequences (Peace Direct, 2016:9). For Boko Haram, its appeal to some women 
and the significance of women and girls for the group should be understood in the context of 
the North East’s heavily patriarchal societies, a widespread adherence to Islamic tenets and 
challenges to established beliefs and practices (ICG, 2016:2). It is thus, patriarchal nationalism 
come to life, employing gender norms to define women as child bearers, and men as soldiers. 
The impetus to control women’s reproduction and labour influenced them to abduct the Chibok 
girls and hundreds of other women and girls for use as “wives,” sex slaves, and unpaid domestic 
labour (Okome, 2017:2). According to Bloom and Matfess (2016), 
The group’s conceptualization of females has also distinguished it from 
other Islamist movements in North East Nigeria; given the group’s 
origins as a dissident movement, methods of differentiation are critical 
aspects of the insurgency. Analyzing the group’s propaganda and the 
local religious-political context in which it operates shows how women, 
and their position within the group’s ideology, allow Boko Haram to 
differentiate itself from other Nigerian Salafi movements. Other Salafi 
groups have advocated for women’s education and have coexisted with 
the Nigerian secular state—by emphasizing its differences with such 
movements, Boko Haram portrays itself as the vanguard of ‘true Islam.’ 
(BLOOM; MATFESS, 2016). 
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Since its emergence in 2002, Boko Haram has paid particular attention to women in 
rhetoric and actions, partly because of the intense debate surrounding their role in society in the 
North East. Among other revivalist Islamic movements, the sect called for tighter restrictions 
on them in some areas of life but also promoted their access to Islamic education and offered 
financial empowerment. With patriarchy, poverty, corruption, early marriage and illiteracy long 
thwarting their life chances, some women saw an opportunity in Boko Haram to advance their 
freedoms or reduce their hardship. Many valued the religious and moral anchoring (ICG, 
2016:i). Thereafter, Boko Haram began to abduct women and girls for both political and 
pragmatic ends, including to protest the arrest of female members and relatives of some leaders. 
The seizure of more than 200 schoolgirls near Chibok in 2014 was a much publicised spike in 
a wider trend. The group took Christian and later Muslim females to hurt communities that 
opposed it, as a politically symbolic imposition of its will and as assets. By awarding “wives” 
to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised combatants. Because women were not 
considered a threat, female followers and forced conscripts could initially circulate in 
government-controlled areas more easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For 
the same reason, from mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly 
pressed for manpower, it also trained women to fight (ICG, 2016:i).  
The imposition of Sharia law in the Northern States of Nigeria at the end of the military 
dictatorship in 1999 provided the context for the rise and open support for groups such as Boko 
Haram. As long as there was a military dictatorship to crush opposition to exploitation and 
economic terrorism, state terror supplemented domestic violence and the exploitation of young 
girls. However, the anti-dictatorship struggle had taken such deep roots that the resort to religion 
was deemed the most expedient force to divide the working peoples of Nigeria and to enforce 
the super exploitation of women (Campbell, 2014). 
 
V. Chibok Girls: The Bumpy Road to Sambisa Forest 
 
Boko Haram’s overall objective is to establish an “extremist Islamic State with a strict 
adherence to their own version of Sharia (Islamic law), which includes forbidding western 
education, particularly to females” (Giroux and Gilpin, 2014 cited in Nti, 2014). It blames 
western education and modernization for the “bad governance and acute corruption of political 
elites” in Nigeria. Therefore, while the group has attacked a variety of public spaces, schools 
are highly vulnerable as was witnessed in Chibok, Borno State, northern Nigeria (Nti, 2014). 
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2013 marked a significant evolution in Boko Haram’s tactics. Boko Haram carried out a series 
of kidnappings, in which one of the main features was the instrumental use of women, in 
response to corresponding tactics by the Nigerian government (Zenn and Pearson, 2014:47). 
The use of violence and intimidation as well as kidnap, forced marriage and compulsory 
conversion to Islam is one tactical way Boko Haram plays on the psychology of women. 
Between February 2013 and May 2013, the kidnapping strategy was brought into force 
with the abductions of more than a dozen government officials and their families in Boko 
Haram’s main base of Borno State. In May 2013, Boko Haram carried out a mass assault on a 
police barracks in Bama, Borno State in which militants captured 12 Christian women and 
children (Agence France-Presse, 13 May 2013 cited in Zenn and Pearson, 2014:47). This was 
a prolonged attack, and the abductions followed a fierce battle with security forces in which 
more than 100 people were killed. On May 7, 2013, Shekau claimed the kidnappings of these 
12 women and children in Boko Haram’s name. In another video message, he then promised to 
make these hostages his ‘servants’ if certain conditions, such as the release of Boko Haram 
members and their wives from prison, were not met (Agence France-Presse, video, 13 May 
2013 cited in Zenn and Pearson, 2014:47). 
The availability of women for sexual purposes became a means of satisfying insurgents 
and cultivating loyalty. A Civilian Joint Task Force commander, who participated in a raid that 
liberated women and girls, linked the abduction of women to the Nigerian government’s 
counterterrorism deployment of security forces to urban centers; he asserted that when 
Maiduguri (Borno’s capital) became “too hot” for the insurgents, they abandoned their urban 
wives and began “picking up women anywhere and using them to satisfy themselves” (Bloo 
and, Matfess, 2016). 
On the night of April 14-15, 2014 up to three hundred girls from different schools in 
Northeastern Nigeria gathered for their final examinations in the town of Chibok. Instead of 
taking their tests, they were kidnapped (Campbell, 2014a). Many schools in the northeast region 
had shut down. Boko Haram was targeting them because of their opposition to Western 
education, which the militants believe corrupts the values of Muslims. But Chibok had not been 
attacked before, so it was felt safe to use the school for the important final year exams. Many 
of the pupils were Christians. The gunmen arrived in the town late at night in a blaze of gunfire 
and headed for the school where they raided the dormitories and loaded the girls on to lorries 
(BBC News, May 8, 2017). For many around the globe, the mass abduction provided a stunning 
introduction to Bok Haram and increased pressure on the government to fight the militant group 
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which has raged through parts of northern Nigeria for years, burning entire villages and carrying 
out rape, beheadings, looting and other acts of violence. 
This grew into a global campaign which spread to the streets of Nigeria with 
demonstrations led by women’s organisations. Nigerian government officials and the then First 
Lady, Patience Jonathan, accused protestors of trying to discredit the government (Hassan, 2014 
cited in Nti, 2014). She went further to request the detention of two of their leaders. Indeed, 
prior to Yousafzai Malala's visit -also, being at the forefront of government intervention to bring 
back the kidnapped Nigerian girls -the government of Nigeria had been avoiding taking public 
action against Boko Haram. However, after meeting with the president of Nigeria, Goodluck 
Jonathan, Malala announced that: "The president promised me... that the abducted girls will 
return to their homes soon" (Global Citizen, 2014).  
Following the President’s confirmation of the abduction, the Nigerian government and 
security services began providing details on the girls. But there was one problem about the 
actual number of schoolgirls abducted which kept changing. It ranged from 100 to almost 300, 
with similar confusion regarding the escapees. In May 2014, a police commissioner explained 
the confusion as due to the convening of girls from different schools (AlJazeera, 2014). 
Curiously, after the kidnapping, the Nigerian state continued to treat the question of Boko haram 
as a low level insurgency. It was full three weeks before the President of Nigeria made a 
substantial statement on the kidnappings in Chibok after women of Nigeria protested that the 
government was not doing enough (Campbella, 2014a). 
Three weeks after the abduction, on May 5, Boko Haram’s Abubakar Shekau claimed 
responsibility for the kidnapping. Some victims managed to escape, and the numbers still held 
in captivity are soft. The figure most often cited by the media is 276 (Campbell, 2014b). The 
kidnapping of the girls at Government Secondary School Chibok, Borno State, brought into 
international prominence the organization Jama'atu Ahlis Suna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad or Boko 
Haram. This incident heralded a new trajectory in Boko Haram's tactics and strategies. Before 
the 2014 incident, the Chibok community was that unknown Local Government Area (LGA) 
together with 26 others in Borno State. Its prominence in social, political, security and media 
circles is unfortunately hinged on pain and gloom (africanews, 2016). It is believed that the 
gunmen took the girls to the Sambisa forest near the Cameroonian border. Ever since, it has 
been a litany of tales regarding the fate of the kidnapped girls. It suffices to state that the tales 
indicate grave violations of international and domestic laws as well as an affront on the rights 
of the abducted girls. 
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Three videos have been released to date. On 14 August 2016, a Boko Haram tape 
showed about 50 of the girls and contained a demand for the release of imprisoned militants in 
exchange for them. The group also said some girls had been killed or injured in government air 
strikes. In April 2016 a video was broadcast by CNN, which appeared to show some of the 
kidnapped schoolgirls alive. In May 2014, Boko Haram released a video of around 130 girls 
gathered together reciting the Koran. Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau has said all the girls 
have converted to Islam and had been "married off". In 2016, three women who claimed they 
were held in the same camps as some of the Chibok girls told the BBC some of them had 
become fighters - though this testimony has never been verified (BBC News, May 8, 2017). 
It is argued that the girls kidnapped in Chibok in 2014 represent a small fraction of the 
number of people taken by Boko Haram. Exact figures are hard to come by, but in 2015 
Amnesty International affirmed that at least 2,000 women and girls had been taken since 2014, 
with many of them being forced into sexual slavery. But some of those have been freed. 
Amnesty Nigeria's spokesperson Isa Sanusi said that since 2014 his organisation has recorded 
14 mass abductions and that it still gets reports of kidnappings on a regular basis (BBC News, 
May 8, 2017). The rise of the Islamist militant group Boko Haram has forced more than 2.6 
million people to flee from their homes across Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad, more than half of 
them children. Many survivors have endured horrific violence, including sexual assault 
(Graham-Harrison, 2017). The group, which surpassed the Islamic State as the deadliest terror 
group, has employed suicide tactics since 2011 and female suicide bombers since June 2014. 
Apart from the core issue of terrorism which traverses the entire gamut of the debacle, 
it is imperative to situate the crisis in its proper legal context. In line with accounts reportedly 
narrated by some of the girls who escaped the kidnapping, they are being subjected to rape by 
the insurgents. Indeed, some stated that it was these grievous acts that made them to risk their 
lives by daring to escape. A 16-year-old Comfort Bulus who was reported to have escaped from 
the Sambisa camp said that some of the girls were raped and forced to convert to Islam. Those 
who refused had their throats cut (Adekoya, 2014). It is also reported that the girls were being 
subjected to doing domestic chores such as cooking and washing plates for the insurgents. There 
are also accounts to the effect that some of the girls are either being married off to the insurgents, 
or are being given out in marriages for a fee to other nationals (Adekoya, 2014). These stories 
have had debilitating impact on the families of the abducted girls. In a development considered 
an act of desperation, before the May 2017 release of the 82 girls, some Chibok residents had 
already performed funeral rites for their children, while others have asked the government to 
declare their children legally dead so that they can move on with their own lives (Freeman, 
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2016). Their desperation and frustration are understandable as parents. Since the abductions, at 
least 18 parents have also died of natural causes, with heart failure, stomach ulcers and other 
"stress" related conditions all blamed for such (Freeman, 2016). 
As would be discussed in subsequent sections, women’s and girls’ importance for Boko 
Haram stems from their roles and how they are perceived in society – both in the North East 
and in Nigeria as a whole. As wives, they enhance social status and provide sexual or domestic 
services (sometimes forced), thereby becoming valuable incentives for potential male recruits. 
Their adherence, willing or forced, to the movement’s version of Islam can also contribute to 
the spreading of its ideology among other women, but possibly also young men (ICG, 2016:6). 
 
VI. Local and Global Advocacy: The Nuances and Outcomes 
 
The emergence of violence as a crucial issue for women and development in the Third 
World has arisen from grassroots women's endeavours rather than being initiated by outside 
authorities or international agencies. Violence is increasingly identified as a priority concern 
among various regions of the world, and/or as a problem that limits women's participation in or 
capacity to benefit from development projects. Women have taken leadership in making 
violence against themselves visible, and in addressing its causes and manifestations, as well as 
its remedies (Carrillo, 1991:18). This is not unconnected with the fact that both women and 
children have been disproportionately affected by conflict as casualties of violence, as internally 
displaced persons and as refugees. Violence against women and children in conflict harms 
families, impoverishes communities and reinforces other forms of inequality. In addition, 
women and girls suffer direct violations of their physical integrity, for example through 
reproductive violations and enforced pregnancy (African Union, 2013).  
The Boko Haram sect has abducted at least 500 women and girls in North-eastern 
Nigeria since 2009 and has perpetrated numerous physical and psychological abuses against 
them in captivity (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Haruna, 2014). The April14, 2014 abduction of 
276 girls from a Government Secondary School in Chibok, a rural town in Borno State, the 
biggest single incident of abduction by Boko Haram till date brought to the fore its strategic 
focus on women and girls. Indeed, the Chibok abductions and ensuing controversy provided 
the first nationally and internationally recognized symbol of the group’s violence against 
women (Bloom and Matfess, 2016).  
Though Boko Haram is known to be the most significant source of violence in Nigeria 
since the transition to democracy in 1999, the group’s abuses against women have also earned 
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it international notoriety. When the group abducted the Chibok Girls from their school in April 
2014, impassioned advocates around the world promulgated the #BringBackOurGirls 
movement and popularized the hashtag on social media, demanding that former President 
Goodluck Jonathan mount a serious effort to rescue the victims. Not only did human rights 
advocates marshal support through NGOs and public awareness campaigns, but Nigeria’s 
international partners, including the United States, also provided supplementary military 
support (Bloom and Matfess, 2016). For instance, late in May 2014, President Obama 
announced that 80 military personnel will be deployed to Chad to fly surveillance aircraft and 
drones to aid in the search. This is in addition to an earlier dispatch of “experts” to Nigeria to 
advise the government, in collaboration with a team of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 
officials (Lazare, 2014). In Washington, D.C., New York City, London, and other major cities, 
rallies were held calling for the return of the girls. 
Many local and international organizations made public statements calling on the 
Nigerian Government for the release of the abducted girls, as part of the on-going global 
campaign. UNICEF, an organization focused on the realization of children's rights, has been 
vocal in their opposition to Boko Haram and their commitment to bringing back the kidnapped 
girls while Amnesty International has been prominent voice in the violence that surged through 
Nigeria at the time of the kidnapping (Global Citizen, 2014).  Among organizations that are 
championing the clarion call for the “BBOG” global campaign include but not limited to; 
Women Arise against Terror, African National Congress of Women’s League South Africa, 
The Global Partnership for Education (GPE), United Nations (UN), Nigeria’s National 
Orientation Agency. 
While following in the pattern of other terrorist groups, Boko Haram has also exhibited 
particular characteristics unique to Northern Nigeria in its conceptualization of women’s roles 
and its use of rape as a weapon of war. In addition to rape for the purposes of torture, 
punishment, or humiliation, the group appears to be using rape to produce the next generation 
of extremists that will pursue Boko Haram’s particular brand of jihad(Bloom and Matfess, 
2016). The use of these women and girls—most believed to be between 15 and 18—began not 
long after many girls were kidnapped from the Chibok school. The corresponding time frame 
and the age has prompted widespread theories that Boko Haram enlisted the kidnapped girls, 
many of whom were Christian, in its jihad. It is not impossible that after more than three years 
in captivity some of the Chibok girls could be indoctrinated by their kidnappers enough to carry 
out such attacks, but there’s no physical evidence to tie the two together (Strochlic, 2014). 
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On April 14, 2014, the militant group Boko Haram abducted 276 girls from Chibok, 
Borno State, Nigeria (Ashionye Ogene 2014 cited in Maxfield, 2015:4). Days later, Nigerian 
lawyer Ibrahim Abdullahi tweeted quotes from a public address on the abductions by the former 
Nigerian Minister of Education, Obiageli Ezekwesili. Abdullahi included Ezekwesili’s phrase 
“Bring Back Our Girls,” which became a “viral” hashtag, spreading across national boundaries 
to users well-removed from (and previously oblivious to) Boko Haram’s violence (Anne-Marie 
Tomchak 2014 cited in Maxfield, 2015:4). Michelle Obama made a rousing speech a few weeks 
after their abduction, demanding the girls' return. Millions of people showed their support for 
the #bringbackourgirls campaign. The hashtag was shared more than five million times 
(Mazumdar, 2015). 
The “BBOG” global outrage campaign was thus, launched to raise conscious awareness 
of challenging the Nigerian government towards ensuring safe return of the abductees. Several 
institutional means of consultation with the Nigerian government was initiated via social media 
campaign and face-to-face discussion by concerned citizens of Nigeria as well as world leaders 
and international organizations who express solidarity across continents for the abducted school 
girls (Olutokunbo et al, 2015:65). With the instrumentality of BBOG Nigeria, the 
#BringBackOurGirls hashtag ‘caught fire’ in the wake of the abduction of the girls, #BBOG 
was tweeted over 400,000 times by people from all over the world. It seemed that the world 
was looking for the abducted girls. At the center of the activism, the famous Abuja Unity 
Fountain ‘‘sit-out’‘ sessions that pooled together people from all walks of life, irrespective of 
colour, race, creed, age, educational and social status, constantly and ceaselessly meeting to 
ensure that the ‘pressure is on’(africanews, 2016). 
Especially in the aftermath of Shekau’s video, with threats to sell the girls into slavery, 
there was international outrage. Even First Lady Michelle Obama, Hillary Clinton and 
celebrities including Mary J Blige and Alicia Keys, publicly rallied around the hashtag 
#BringBackOurGirls. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, and other 
countries all offered assistance. There was widespread criticism of the lethargy of the Jonathan 
administration in taking concrete action (Campbell, 2014). With the likes of Obiageli 
Ezekwesili, Aisha Yesufu, Hadiza Bala Usman and others leading the charge, there has been a 
sustained and very well calculated effort to demand that these girls are found. The strategy of 
the BBOG campaign has seen it consolidate its base and reach from the local level through to 
the State and Federal levels. Beyond Nigeria to the sub-regional, continental and international 
levels, the girls of Chibok have entered political and diplomatic circles across the world 
(africanews, 2016).  
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Born out of a need to ensure the plight of the girls was not dismissed, BBOG filled the 
leadership vacuum that emerged after the slow response by the government, and became an 
authoritative voice with its marches, daily sit-ins and online activism. Kadaria Ahmed, a 
journalist and media entrepreneur, describes the movement’s efforts as “amazing, particularly 
because they are operating in an environment where civic and civil advocacy is fairly new. 
Nigerians are not used to the idea that regular people get behind a cause and support it - not for 
personal gains but with a view to promoting a shared cause” (Otas, 2016).  
The Nigerian and diasporic activists routinely referred to the strength of the Nigerian 
people and the necessity of their on-going commitment on behalf of the missing girls. In 
particular, Nigerian activists pressed their fellow citizens and supporters to insist that the 
Nigerian government, including the nation’s military, take action to rescue the missing students. 
Unlike the version of Bring Back Our Girls spread by White users in the Global North, the 
Nigerian focus remained local and included significant outrage toward the Goodluck Jonathon 
administration, which it viewed as both “deceitful” and “inept” (Obiageli Ezekwesili 2014 cited 
in Maxfield, 2015:7). For two years, the federal government kept making moves to find the 
girls and reunite them with their families but it all proved futile.  
Of the girls initially seized, scores escaped in the hours after the kidnapping (Kamouni, 
2016). The Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari, came to power in 2015 after promising 
that his government would release the girls, who have been paraded in several Boko Haram 
videos posted online since their kidnap. After he was elected, though, he said that much as he 
wanted to, it may not be possible to find them (Maclean, 2017). The government has however, 
demonstrated more commitment to the release of the girls than the previous administration. 
Hence, hope remains high, as President Muhammadu Buhari has promised the government will 
“redouble efforts to ensure that we fulfill our pledge of bringing the remaining girls back home. 
Already, the credible first step has been taken and Government will sustain the effort until all 
the remaining girls return safely” (Otas, 2016). 
In May 2016, an army-backed vigilante group in the Sambisa Forest, a Boko Haram 
stronghold close to the border with Cameroon, found one of the girls with her four-month-old 
child. Two other girls managed to escape in September 2016 and January 2017 (BBC News, 
May 8, 2017). October 2016 saw the first mass release with 21 girls being freed following 
negotiations between the government and Boko Haram, brokered by the ICRC. It is believed 
that Boko Haram prisoners were freed in exchange (BBC News, May 8, 2017). The terrorist 
group also freed 82 girls on May 6, 2017 after intense negotiation with a faction of the militant 
group (Sahara Reporters, 2017). The Nigerian government confirmed that 82 Chibok girls were 
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freed by the West African Islamist group as result of “lengthy negotiations” and “in exchange 
for some Boko Haram suspects held by the authorities” (RT News, 2017). The operation 
involved efforts by a variety of national and international actors, including the Swiss 
government, the International Red Cross, the Nigerian military and security services, as well as 
local and foreign non-governmental organizations. 
 
VII. Some of the Key Events Surrounding the Chibok Crisis 
 
The table 1 briefly lists some of the key events surrounding the Chibok Crisis. 
 
Table 1. Some of the Key Events Surrounding the Chibok Crisis 
April 2014 
Boko Haram extremists kidnap 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in northern 
Nigeria, the region where the insurgency emerged several years ago. 
November 2014 Extremists seize Chibok, and Nigerian army takes back the town. 
May 2015 
New President Muhammadu Buhari is sworn in, pledging to tackle Boko 
Haram “head-on.” 
April 13, 2016 
 Boko Haram video appears to show some of the Chibok girls, and tearful 
mothers recognize their daughters. 
May 18, 2016 
Relative says one of the Chibok girls is found, pregnant, in a forest; pressure 
grows on Nigeria’s government to rescue the others. 
August 14, 2016 
 Boko Haram video says some Chibok girls are killed in airstrikes and 
demands release of extremists in exchange for the other girls’ freedom. 
October 13, 2016 
 Spokesman for Nigeria’s president confirms 21 Chibok girls have been 
freed, a result of government negotiations with Boko Haram. Nigeria’s 
government says another 83 girls would be released “very soon.” 
November 5, 2016 
 Military announces the first army rescue of a Chibok girl, during a raid on a 
forest hideout. 
December 24, 2016 
Nigeria’s president declares that Boko Haram has been crushed, driven from 
its last forest hideout. 
January 5, 2017 
Nigeria’s army says soldiers find one of the schoolgirls wandering in the bush 
near the forest stronghold. 
April 14, 2017 Nigerians mark three years since the mass abduction. 
May 6, 2017 Nigeria’s government says another 82 schoolgirls are released. 
Source: NewStage, 20172 
 
During the first phase of the two-step operation, the two commanders, escorted by 
representatives of the military and Red Cross, were handed over to Boko Haram in Banki. 
Honouring their part of the deal, the militants then reportedly took the schoolgirls outside the 
town, where they were subsequently picked up by the military (RT News, 2017). According to 
Vanguard (2017), apart from releasing some Boko Haram suspects, as confirmed by President 
Muhammadu Buhari and Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign and Local Debts, Senator 
                                                            
2 Available at:http://newstage.com.ng/2017/05/11/kidnap-rescue-chibok-school-girls-3-years-later-timeline/ 
http://newstage.com.ng/2017/05/11/kidnap-rescue-chibok-school-girls-3-years-later-timeline/ 
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Shehu Sani, some money was also spent to ease the process. The release brings to 103 the 
number of Chibok girls so far freed, apart from those who escaped on their own since abduction 
on April 14, 2014. 
The split in Boko Haram, which Gaffey (2016) envisaged could complicate the release 
of the remaining girls did not eventually stall further negotiation after all. Boko Haram pledged 
allegiance to ISIS in 2015 under the auspices of its long time leader, Abubakar Shekau. But 
after an ISIS publication named Abu Musab al-Barnawi, a former Boko Haram spokesman, as 
the leader of ISIS’s branch in West Africa, Shekau disavowed Barnawi and claimed to be the 
group’s rightful leader. Clashes have since been reported between Shekau’s faction and 
Barnawi’s. It is not clear how many of the Chibok girls are being held by each group, nor even 
how defined the division is, but any split could mean the Nigerian government is forced to 
negotiate with more than one group to secure the release of the remaining girls (Gaffey, 2016). 
BBOG’s work, according to Otas (2016), has experienced its fair share of challenges. 
The group has endured many years of daily vigil, police tear gas and sometimes personal attacks 
from people who misunderstand their campaign. But they kept the faith and roused the world, 
using all media, to look in their direction and to help their campaign in getting the girls released 
(Daily Trust, 2017). A more serious challenge to the movement came when it started being 
viewed as the opposition by the government. This is the narrative that played out leading up to 
Nigeria’s hotly contested 2014 general election. The more BBOG became vociferous with its 
demand for the girls to be rescued, the more antagonistic the relationship between state and the 
advocacy group became. This led to their sit-ins and protest marches being disrupted by the 
police. Ezekwesili tells me that the government of the then president, Goodluck Jonathon, 
“banned the BBOG from coming out at all to the Unity Fountain (where they had their daily 
sit-ins), as well as marching on the street. Then the FCT Police Commissioner, who later 
became an Assistant Inspector General of Police, made it formal that he was banning our 
movement from engaging in our protest. So, we went to the courts to assert our rights as citizens, 
and as enshrined in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. The court ruled in our favour” (Otas, 2016).  
In September 2016, that scenario repeated itself when the administration of President Buhari 
tried to stop the group from marching in the capital city of Abuja. 
 
VIII. Post- Abduction Recovery, Re-integration and Holistic Development 
 
It is estimated that one in three women is subject to violence over the course of her 
lifetime, even as gender mutilation and child marriages persist. This is coupled with the 
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vicissitudes of Nigerian customary law which generally tends to subjugate the girl-child. It 
behoves on government to provide adequate security especially in the North East zone of the 
country to enable children return to schools, even as efforts must be made to rescue the 
remaining Chibok girls and reunite them with their families (Adekoya, 2014). The 
repercussions of violence against women reverberate throughout the family and community. 
Studies show that children exposed to violence are more likely to become both victims and 
perpetrators (Buvinic et al, 1999).  
Violence against women impoverishes society economically, politically and culturally, 
by limiting the active role that women can make in the development of their community. While 
it is difficult to determine the full cost to society of violence against women, a growing number 
of studies point to the serious economic consequences, including loss of productive time, loss 
of earnings and medical costs (World Bank, 1994). There is a pervasive assumption that girls 
in captivity are subjected to sexual and domestic servitude, sometimes forced to engage in acts 
of brutality in an effort to harden them, and kept in line by acts of barbaric violence and brutality 
(Derluyn et al. 2004). During the three years of captivity, many of the girls have gone through 
adolescence and may appear different than when their parents last saw them.  
Indeed, frequently, returning to their families and communities is the beginning of a 
new ordeal for the girls, as the sexual violence they have suffered often results in stigmatization. 
People are also often afraid the girls have been indoctrinated by Boko Haram and that they pose 
a threat to their communities. The use by Boko Haram of children – mostly girls – as so called 
‘suicide’ bombers has fuelled such fears (UNICEF-Nigeria, 2016). Use of young females as 
suicide bombers, the first instance of the tactic in Nigeria’s history, has attracted much 
publicity. The attacks, which have killed hundreds, have become symbolic of the insurgency’s 
brutality. Between January and April 2017 for instance, a total of 27 children died after 
detonating bombs strapped to their bodies that they were ordered to carry into markets, 
checkpoints and other public places. The number is almost the same as the total who died over 
the whole of 2016, according to a report by UNICEF (See Ruth Maclean, 2017).   
The blurred lines between Boko Haram member, abductee, slave, wife, supporter, 
victim and sympathiser have left many women and girls with the stigma of association. That 
stigma – heightened if they have children born to Boko Haram fathers, even if the pregnancy 
was against their will – is a major obstacle to reintegration into community life (ICG, 2016:15).  
Such social exclusion, coupled with a lack of tailored support, can mean that mental health 
problems can be amplified as children who need a warm welcome and psychosocial support 
continue to be victimised. President Muhammadu Buhari, who said he was “delighted” to meet 
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the newly-freed girls also promised to “personally oversee” their “rehabilitation” (Sridharan, 
2017). These girls, like the ones released previously, will be held in custody in the capital of 
Abuja for medical attention and trauma counselling. The Muhammadu Buhari-led 
administration was however, urged to ensure the girls were not kept in lengthy detention and 
security screening which can only add to their suffering and plight (Daily Trust, 2017). As 
observed by Pernille Ironside (cited in Sridharan, 2017), they will face a long and difficult 
process to rebuild their lives after the indescribable horror and trauma they have suffered at the 
hands of Boko Haram. 
Hence, educating families, community members, religious leaders and schools on 
reintegration practices and how to welcome children back is vital (International Business 
Times, 2017) because the possibility of being shunned by communities can lead to some girls 
choosing to stay with armed groups, while others do so as they perceive life there to be better. 
As a matter of fact, a schoolgirl who was among the kidnapped girls, according to the federal 
government refused to be part of a release deal because she is now married to a militant fighter. 
The disclosure underlines the complex psychological effects of a lengthy captivity, and gives 
an indication of the work required to rehabilitate and reintegrate those released (Xie Zhenqi, 
2017). 
Health and education experts as well as other stakeholders have suggested fundamental 
issues they want government to address to properly integrate the freed girls into the society 
(Sanni, 2017). Furthering their education (I mean with all other displaced children in the region) 
may seriously be constrained by the lack of shelter and other basic education facilities such as 
good buildings, instruction materials and others. In the last few years, many school children 
have been forced out of school recently because of Boko Haram activities, making them to be 
educationally disadvantaged. To achieve the clandestine purpose of truncating western 
education, schools have been targets of choice for Boko Haram since 2009. The United Nations 
(cited in Sanni, 2017), estimated that 1,500 schools were destroyed since 2014, with at least 
1,280 casualties said to be teachers and students. According to UNESCO, Nigeria now has the 
world’s highest number of out-of-school children, due mainly to the terrorists’ activities (Otoo, 
2015). It becomes imperative that the government, more than anything else, must prioritise the 
girls’ integration into society, support relevant institutions to help them reclaim their paused 
dream of acquiring education and provide proper psychosocial support to ensure their well-
being. 
The psychosocial health of the abducted girls, their parents, and their communities must 
be attended to, starting with the girls who have escaped or been rescued thus far (Okome, 
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2017:20). When they do reach safety, girls who have been held by Boko Haram are often ill, 
malnourished, traumatized and exhausted; they are in need of medical attention and 
psychosocial support so they can begin to come to terms with their experiences and reintegrate 
with their families and communities (UNICEF-Nigeria, 2016). Psychosocial support for victims 
should include counseling from professionals and strategies for victims and their families to 
facilitate reintegration into the community. Not all returned abductees can depend on more than 
family assistance, which while important, even crucial, may be more successful when combined 
with culturally appropriate psychological intervention (Okome, 2017:13-14). In a broader 
perspective, Okome (2017:21) suggests that: 
Given the urgency of the situation, the Nigerian government must meet 
its constitutional obligations to all Nigerian citizens and work to build 
peace and security through the comprehensive provision of psychosocial 
support for escapees, those rescued, their families and communities, and 
eventually for the (remaining) Chibok girls who are still in Boko Haram 
captivity, once they are rescued and reunited with their families. 
(OKOME, 2017: 21) 
 
When the Chibok girls were kidnapped from their schools and ripped from the safety of 
home and family, they lost their freedom and their futures (Thomas, 2017). It is a truism that 
several attacks carried out by the Nigerian Islamist group have had a devastating effect on 
education in the country’s north-eastern region.  In the entire region almost one million school-
aged children are out of school and many have been out of school for at least the last two years, 
some up to three, four years. This means that almost an entire generation of children has been 
robbed of their right to education, which is an intrinsic component of their development 
(Deutsche Welle, 2016). More focus on rehabilitating the education system is therefore 
required, including both building new schools and reinforcing positive messages of peace 
through the curriculum. Thus, Becker (2017) avers that “assisting the girls with the completion 
of their education is an important step toward rebuilding their lives and working toward the 
future”. Although, the African Development Bank (AfDB) says it has committed $1 million for 
the rebuilding of Government Girls Secondary School (GGSS), Chibok, Borno state (The 
Cable, 2017), more forms of synergy are required among government institutions and 
international partners. For instance, since January 2016, UNICEF and its partner International 
Alert have been providing psychosocial support for women and girls who have experienced 
sexual violence at the hands of Boko Haram. UNICEF and International Alert are also working 
with affected communities through a network of trained religious and community leaders to 
promote acceptance and to address negative perceptions that hamper the reintegration of women 
and girls who have suffered such violence (UNICEF-Nigeria, 2016). It is projected that all of 
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the 24 girls who were rescued from Boko Haram in 2016 will be returning to school this 
September (Becker, 2017).  
Generally, there is concern for the growing number of children unable to access 
education, as a result of the conflicts in this region, the displacement of many and proliferation 
of IDP camps, and the direct loss of life during communal clashes over land and resources 
(Peace Direct, 2016:26). The challenge common to many conflict issues in Northern Nigeria is 
to find productive ways to support young people who, as well as being victims or survivors of 
conflict, are often drawn into violence. Only through an ambitious strategy to support young 
people and provide fairer economic development can they be offered a better future – and their 
involvement in violence reduced (Peace Direct, 2016:3). There is a tendency to associate 
Northern Nigeria solely with the violence of Boko Haram. In fact, a wide range of conflicts and 
issues affect the region. Only through a more nuanced understanding of these issues, and how 
they have given rise to Boko Haram as well as other violence, will peace-builders and their 
partners be able to address them. 
 
IX. Conclusion  
 
The growing incidence of gender-based violence no doubt constitutes a serious threat to 
gender development and equality globally. Women’s rights are constantly under assault thereby 
undermining gender rights, equality and development (Adekoya, 2014). Thus strategies need to 
be developed which educate the media and public institutions and which sensitize the general 
public, including women themselves, on the disastrous personal and national consequences of 
continued violence against women (Carrillo, 1991:18). Also, a way forward to combat impunity 
and prevent the different crimes women and girls often suffer from during armed conflicts, is 
to organise sensitisation campaigns through electronic and other mass media means of 
communication, that should aim at potential victims (by informing them about their rights and 
related International Instruments protecting them); offenders (by drawing their attention on 
their responsibilities and the related instruments organising their prosecution); and the field 
Civil Society Organisations (on their obligations or responsibilities). The sensitisation should 
focus on the sure and subsequent prospect of accountability for any act of human rights abuse 
by all those responsible (Sita, 2008:36).  
How gender dynamics play a part in fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency should be a 
clear warning that women’s integration into decision-making processes at all levels is critical 
to a durable peace. Countering the sect and rebuilding a peaceful society in the North East 
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requires the government and its international partners to tackle gender discrimination, better 
protect women and girls affected by the violence and support women’s economic and social 
reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace (ICG, 2016:ii). All 
development and reconstruction plans, public and private, should be based on gender-sensitive 
analysis of the insurgency and counter-insurgency. Programming should acknowledge that in 
the North East religion can facilitate assistance and be a driving force for promoting positive 
change for women generally (ibid). In the final analysis, more research is also needed on the 
triggers for recruitment into violent extremist groups in Northern Nigeria, to help more effective 
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